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NINTH GROUND FOR DIVORCE
THE NINTH GROUND FOR DIVORCE IN
VIRGINIA: STATUTORY SEPARATION
FOR THREE YEARS
D. A. HENDLER AND W. KENDALL LIPSCOMB
Virginia added a ninth ground for divorce a vincuto which
took effect in 1960. The ground applies "on the application
of either party if and when the husband and the wife have
lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without
interruption for three years, and at the time of separation were
each resident and domiciled in Virginia. Divorce on this
ground shall not be granted where service of process is by
publication." 1
This is not a unique ground for divorce, for many states
have similar statutory provisions. 2 The purpose of granting a
divorce after the lapse of a statutory period of separation can
best be found in the expressions of the courts which have
interpreted such a statute. The Nevada court stated:
The legislative concept embodied in the statute is that
when the conduct of the parties in living apart over a long
lapse of time without cohabitation has made it probable
that they cannot live together in happiness, the best
interest of the parties will be promoted by a divorce.3
The Louisiana court stated that it was a matter of public
policy to grant a divorce after there has been separation for a
statutory period because:
[I]t is better for spouses who have been living separately
and apart for the statutory period and have found re-
conciliation to be hopeless to have an opportunity to re-
marry and re-establish the family relationship. 4
'VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (9) (Repl. Vol. 1960).
2 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, Wyoming, Washington, and Washington, D. C. See also, 51
A.L.R. 763 and 138 A.L.R. 341.
3 George v. George, 56 Nev. 12, 41 P.2d 1059, 1060 (1935).
4 Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 1083, 26 So.2d 146, 148 (1946).
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To date there are no Virginia cases interpreting the new
statute, but there are ample decisions from other jurisdictions
to which the Virginia courts can look if and when interpreta-
tion becomes necessary.
An immediate question arising under the amendment is
when does the three year statutory period begin to run. Will
a person have to wait three years from the enactment of the
amendment, or is it to apply retroactively so that any person
who qualified at the time of the enactment will be able to
avail himself of the remedy? This precise question was an-
swered by the Arizona and Louisiana courts both holding the
statute to be retroactive and not confined to rights and persons
coming within its scope in the future. s "The act is remedial
in its nature, and it took effect upon people as it found them
. . . (it gives) the remedy to those who have lived separate
and apart for more than (the statutory period)." 5 In Schuster
v. Schuster, the defense was offered that the persons must live
apart for the full statutory period after the enactment of the
statute. The Arizona court rejected this contention and said
the statute included those years of separation prior to the
enactment.
It is plain ... from the language used ... that the legis-
lature intended it to apply to situations existing when it was
passed, for it expressly states that a divorce may be granted
the husband and wife who have not lived or cohabitated
together (for the statutory period). This clearly refers to
the past as well as to the future. [Emphasis added] 7
The Virginia statute likewise provides relief where the persons
"have lived separately" and should be interpreted so as to be
given a retroactive application.
The Virginia statute gives relief upon "the application of
either party," but is there an implication that the party making
application must be without fault? At first glance, it would
5 Dowie v. Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921); Schuster v. Schuster,
42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933).
6 Dowie v. Becker, supra, note 5, at 779.
7Schuster v. Schuster, supra, note 5, at 562.
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seem that fault would be immaterial, but some states have
declared that absence of fault is implied in such a statute.
There are conflicting opinions among those jurisdictions
adopting separation as a ground for divorce as to whether
recrimination is a good defense. On the one hand, the Loui-
siana statute gives the court no discretion, but states that "a
divorce shall be granted on proof of the continuous living
separate and apart of the spouses . . . " [Emphasis added] .s
On the other hand many statutes give the court room to
exercise discretion in granting the divorce. The Virginia
statute is prefaced "a divorce ... may be decreed . . ." [Em-
phasis added]. This leaves the granting of the divorce to the
discretion of the court. This does not necessarily mean that the
court has discretion to consider fault. In Nevada the trial
court is given discretion to grant the divorce for the statutory
separation, however, in George v. George, 9 the Nevada court
held immaterial defendant's allegation that the plaintiff
failed to introduce sufficient evidence upon which the court
could exercise its discretion. The court interpreted the de-
fendant's allegation to mean that the trial court must have
evidence of the marital conduct of the spouses so that it may
determine which party was the guilty party. The judge said
that this is not what the court n-iust consider to exercise its
discretion, but it is "the probability of their being able to
live together in such a manner as to be for their best interests
and the best interests of society." 1 o The Rhode Island court,
on the other hand, has held that good or bad conduct is
admissible to aid the court in exercising its discretion, however
the conduct of the plaintiff is not decisive of the question, In
Smith v. Smith it stated as follows:
It is evident that the conjugal life and the family life
of the parties are permanently disrupted. There is no in-
clination for and no prospect of a reconciliation. Nothing
is left of the marriage relationship but the legal tie. Re-
spondent contends that regardless of these facts, petitioner
should be punished for his misconduct by a refusal of the
trial justice to dissolve the marriage. If it appeared that
8LA. REV. STAT. § 9:301 (1950).
SSupra note 3.
lo Id. at 1060.
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there was any advantage to the family or to the state in
continuing the marital status, the divorce might well be
denied. But no such advantage is apparent. On the con-
trary, it is plain that to compel the parties to continue in
their present status would be prejudicial to the parties
and their children.'
In reality, Rhode Island, as Nevada, held that the discretion
is based on the best interest of the parties and society and not
on the fault of the parties.
Kentucky's statute1 2 expressly states that where the
parties live separate and apart for the statutory period they are
entitled to a divorce regardless of who is at fault with regard
to the separation. The Arizona and Wyoming provisions are
slightly different from the Virginia provision, but their courts'
handling of the problem of recrimination might be helpful
to the Virginia courts.
The Arizona statute provides: "... when for any reason
[Emphasis added] the husband and wife have not lived or
cohabited together for the statutory period . . ." 13 they may
get a divorce. This revised provision omitted "on application
of the aggrieved party" which appeared in the 1913 code.' 4
Under the revised section the court rejected the defendant's
argument that the omitted clause should be implied so that
the offending party could not take advantage of his own
wrong. 1 5
The Wyoming court, under a statute which was very much
like the one in Virginia, had held that it did not matter whose
fault brought about the separation. The Wyoming legislature
added an amendment which read:
... but not upon such grounds if such separation has been
induced or justified by cause chargeable in whole or material
I' Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 236, 172 At. 323, 324 (1934).
12 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.020 (1943).
13ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 27-802(9) (1939).
'4ARIZ. REV. STAT., para. 3859 (1913).
15 Rozboril v. Rozboril, 60 Ariz. 247, 135 P.2d 221 (1943).
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part to the party seeking divorce upon such grounds, in
the action., 6
Even with this proviso, the Wyoming court adopted a very
liberal interpretation. 17 It held that the plaintiff merely has
to show that there was a living apart to create a prima fade
presumption that he is the injured party and entitled to a
divorce. It should be noted that this is not a conclusive pre-
sumption, and the defendant may show who in fact is the
injured party and by so doing preclude the divorce.
Virginia would have no reason to adopt such an interpreta-
tion under its statute which does not have such a proviso,
but it could find authority to do so in other state decisions.
The North Carolina court in Sanderson v. Sanderson, 18 reversed
an earlier decision which had held that the subsection providing
for separation as grounds 9 was separate from the main part
of the statute which provided that only the injured party could
bring the suit. This interpretation, of course, makes the North
Carolina statute different from Virginia's statute. The North
Carolina courts are as liberal as possible within the restrictions
of their statute. In Long v. Long2o it was held that the applicant
for the divorce need not be the injured party.
Virginia should not consider fault of the applicant in
reaching its decision. The majority of the jurisdictions do
not 2 1 , and of those which do many are forced to do so because
of the wording of their statutes. It should be noted also that
the latter jurisdictions are as liberal as they are permitted to
be under the expressed restrictions of the statutes. Virginia's
statute has no such expressed restrictions. The legislature set
up no barriers, and the courts should not create their own.
It is hoped that the Virginia court will remember:
16 Wyo. Session Laws 1941, ch. 2, § 35-108 (now WYO. COMP. STAT. § 35-
3905 (1945)).
17Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200 (1947).
18 178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919).
19 N. C. Consol. Stat., ch. 30, § 5 (now N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6
(Rep. Vol. 1950).
20 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934).
21 Ill A.L.R. 870 and 166 A.L.R. 503.
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The basis for a divorce on the grounds of living separate
and apart ... is not the wrongdoing of one of the parties.
It is the policy of the state, where the husband and wife
have, for so long a time, failed to become reconciled not
to compel them to continue in a marital status which is
ostensible rather than real. 2 2
NATURE OF THE SEPARATION
One of the mandatory requirements of the Virginia statute
is that the parties must have lived separately for the entire
statutory period. The Virginia courts will be asked to decide
the nature of the separation. This question has come up often
in the several states which allow divorce for mere separation
and has become a very important element in deciding the
cases. One case holds that:
* * * the separation of the married persons referred to in
the statute means more than mere living apart. Business
and other necessities may require the husband to live in one
place and the wife in another. A separation of this char-
acter is not within the meaning of the statute. The separa-
tion intended ... is a separation by which the marital asso-
ciation is severed. It means the living asunder of the
husband and wife. It is a voluntary act and the separation
must be with the intent ... to live apart, because of their
mutual purpose to do so, or because one of the parties with
or without the acquiescence of the other intends to discon-
tinue the marital relationship. 2 3
This point can be illustrated by a case in which the husband
was inducted into the navy in January of 1943 .24 His wife
remained at the marital domicile until May of 1943 then also
left the home. The husband petitioned the court for an abso-
lute divorce in February of 1945 on the grounds of statutory
separation under the statutory period of two years. The divorce
was denied because the separation was not voluntary. He did
not leave the marital domicile by his own free will, but was
required to do so by the induction. Further, he had failed to
2 2 McKenna v. McKenna, 53 R. 1. 373, 166 At. 822, 823 (1933).
23 Supra note 4, at 148.
24 Id. at 146.
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show he intended to abandon the marriage when he departed.
The action would however have lain two years from the date
on which the wife left the marital domicile with the intent of
discontinuing the marriage. On the other hand where the
separation took place prior to the induction, the Louisiana
court held25 that the statutory period kept running through
the years in service and in this case the period was sufficient.
The latter case presented another question, which in law is not
settled. Must the separation be voluntary for the full statutory
period or will a bona fide request for reconciliation or an
intervening involuntary confinement stop the running of the
period and dissolve the ground for divorce? The Washington,
D. C. statute 26 expressly states that the separation must be
"voluntary." The courts interpret27 this to mean that the
separation must be voluntary for the full statutory period and
not only at the inception. The burden, however, was placed
on the defendant to show that the separation was no longer
voluntary.
This problem most often arises where there is insanity of
one of the parties during the required period. The courts have
treated insanity as a special situation. This can be seen in the
case of Camire v. Camire2s where the Rhode Island court
refused to grant a divorce when one party was in an insane
asylum for a part of the statutory period, even though there
was no provision requiring the separation to be voluntary.
From the cases that have passed on this point, the majority
rule is apparently that a person should be in a normal state of
mind for the full period2 - . The contrary view holds that the
right attaches immediately upon separation and is completed
at the end of the statutory period and the intervention of
25 Davis v. Watts, 208 La. 290,23 So.2d 97 (1945).
26 D. C. CODE § 16-403 (1940).
27 Bowers v. Bowers, 143 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
2843 R. 1. 489,113 Ad. 748 (1921).
29 111 A.L.R. 872. Where the jurisdiction holds that the separation must
be by consent of both parties, it is held that if one of the parties is
insane at the time of separation or during the period of separation, the
divorce must be denied since the insanity prevents the giving of the
required consent.
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insanity is immaterial. Louisiana and Kentucky30 allow a
divorce when the separation is voluntary at its inception even
though insanity intervenes, but they will not grant a divorce
when the defendant was insane at the time of the separation.
In the latter situation, the separation is not considered to be
voluntary.
The Kentucky court rejected the idea that the separation
should continue to be voluntary throughout the statutory
period. In Colston v. Colston31, the parties voluntarily separated
in 1932. The plaintiff was later confined to prison from 1936-
1942. He brought an action for divorce on grounds of statutory
separation. The defense that the separation was not voluntary
during the statutory period was rejected. The court allowed
the inclusion of the period of imprisonment, even though the
action was brought by the prisoner. The judge concluded that:
... no reason or purpose behind the statute is to be served
by holding that the period of confinement may not be
considered as a living separate and apart within the meaning
of the statute. No such exclusionary language appears in
the statute and none should be read into it, when it is
dearly unnecessary to do so to effectuate the legislative
intent. 3 2
There is strong disagreement among the courts as to
whether there must be mutual consent of the parties. The
majority of the courts have held it sufficient if the separation
is voluntary as to only one of the parties and that mutual
consent is not required.33 There are few cases which adopt
this view expressly, but it is certainly implied in those jurisdic-
tions holding that the fault of the plaintiff does not preclude
a granting of divorce. The wording of the Virginia statute
lends itself to either interpretation. The Kentucky court
rejected34 the idea of mutual consent as a prerequisite. A
30 Galiano v. Monteleone, 178 La. 567, 152 So. 126 (1933); Andrews v.
Andrews, 120 Ky. 718, 87 S.W. 1080 (1905).
31 297 Ky. 250, 179 S.W.2d 893 (1944).
32 Id. at 894.
33 17 AM. JUR., Divorce and Separation § 181 (1957).
84 Davis v. Davis, 120 Ky. 440, 43 S.W. 168 (1897).
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wife was given a divorce from her husband who spent the
statutory period in prison. The separation certainly was not
entered into by a mutual agreement to break the marriage
vows. It was brought about by the husband's involuntary
incarceration and the wife's desire to end the marriage. As the
Kentucky court announced:
•.. where a husband is serving a life sentence.., the wife
should not be denied a divorce for abandonment upon the
grounds that the separation is without fault on his part. 3
The Arkansas statute expressly provides that divorce be given
".. . regardless of whether the separation was the voluntary
act or by the mutual consent of the parties." 3 6 In Brooks v.
Brooks3 7, this statute was declared to mean that the divorce
should be granted the husband even though the wife claimed
the separation was not voluntary on her part and that she was in
fact coerced into the separation. This decision was not rendered
without dissent in spite of the expressed statutory provision.
The minority view requiring mutual agreement is adopted
by Maryland, whose statute, 38 unlike Virginia, provides for
"voluntary separation." Voluntary separation means that the
two persons acted willingly and without coercion in the act
of separating. " 'Voluntary' connotes agreement. Unless
the parties agree to live apart the separation can not be volun-
tary." 3 9 The same court has held that the statutory separation
was not applicable when the husband voluntarily left home
without justification and the wife did not consent, 40 or when
the wife consistently expressed a desire to continue the
marital relationship.41 The Maryland court 42 felt itself
bound to this view because it was set by the legislature in
35 Ibid.
36 Ark. Acts 1939, § 2-7 (now ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202) (1947).
37 201 Ark. 14, 143 S.W.2d 1098 (1940).
323MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 33 (1951).
39 France v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 176 Md. 306, 4 A.2d
717, 726 (1939).
40 Miller v. Miller, 178 Md. 1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940).
41 Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A.2d 924 (1940).
42 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 202 Md. 352, 104 A.2d 595 (1954).
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adopting the language "voluntary separation."43 The Vir-
ginia statute does not contain the word "voluntary" and the
Maryland court's "forced" interpretation of its statute is not
controlling authority in the interpretation of the Virginia
statute. It can not be denied that such an interpretation could
be rendered from the Language of the Virginia statute, although
it would seem to defeat the intent of the statutory scheme.
Such an interpretation was made by the North Carolina
court 44 under a statute 4 5 without the word "voluntary" (it
now appears in the 1950 code) which held that the word
"separation" as applied to the legal status of a husband and
wife means more than "abandonment"--it means "a cessation
of cohabitation of husband and wife, by mutual agree-
ment." 4 6 This was reiterated in Williams v. Williams4 in 1944,
and Pearce v. Pearce48 in 1945.
Virginia also has a statutory ground for divorce for de-
sertion 49 when the separation is without the consent and
against the wishes of one of the parties. Since the deserted
party has grounds for divorce when the separation is for one
year and without his consent, it should follow that he would
have grounds when the separation is for three years without
his consent.
In Pearce v. Pearce,50 a husband and wife signed a separa-
tion agreement and after the statutory period elapsed the
husband petitioned for divorce, and the wife claimed the
agreement was obtained by fraud and therefore was not by
mutual consent. The court decided that the husband must
show that the separation was "voluntary" at the inception
and that if his wife's consent was obtained by fraud or deceit
43 Supra note 38.
44Oliver v. Oliver, 219 N.C. 299, 135 S.E.2d 549 (1941).
45 N. C. Consol. Stat., ch. 30, § 5 (now N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6
(Repl. Vol. 1950)).
46 Supra note 44, at 551.
47224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944).
48225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945).
49 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(b) (Repi. Vol. 1960).
50 Supra note 48.
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it was not voluntary within the meaning of the law. In this
case, however, the defendant (wife) did not show that she
was ordered out or that the agreement was in fact induced by
fraud. She merely showed that he bargained and persuaded
her to sign an agreement, and the court held that this would
not prevent the divorce.
Regardless of what rule the Virginia court may adopt as to
the nature of the separation required, it would be in the
public interest if it would adopt the rule that allows the divorce
even though the separation is not voluntary at its inception,
if it later becomes so, and the three years elapse from that
time. This rule is adopted in all states whether they require
the separation to be voluntary as to one or to both spouses. r 1
The intent to disrupt the marital relationship "... . may begin
at any time, contemporaneously with or during the physical
separation . . . (I)t may begin any time after the physical
separation, but in that event it must continue without interrup-
tion (for the statutory period) from the time of the agree-
ment" 52 to separate.
The Virginia statute provides that the parties live separate
and apart without cohabitation for three years. The question
might arise as to what is meant by "separate and apart".
Apparently from the few cases on the subject, living under
the same roof is not living separate and apart. 5 3 This is true
even where a spouse is denied his conjugal rights. In a
Washington case 54 the husband failed to prove he lived
separate and apart when he failed to deny he lived in the same
house as his wife during the statutory period. His defense
that he was denied sexual intercourse did not strengthen his
case, for "denial of conjugal rights may be a basis for divorce,
but it cannot be established under an allegation that the parties
have lived separate and apart for more than (the statutory
period)." .5 Likewise, the fact that the parties lived in separate
51 27A CJS Divorce § 42 (1959).
52 Supra note 39, at 726.
53 Supra note 51.
54 McNary v. McNary, 8 Wash.2d 250, 111 P.2cd 760 (1941).
55 Id. at 761.
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rooms (in this case it was the wife's boarding house) and had
no sexual relations, would not be living separate and apart
under the Alabama court's interpretation. 5 6
The word "separation" means more than refraining from
sexual intercourse; it means the absence of the total marital
relationship. In Dudley v. Dudley, 5 a North Carolina de-
cision, a husband was denied divorce although he pleaded he
had not cohabitated for the statutory period and should be
granted a divorce although he lived in the same house with
his wife. Quoting from American Jurisprudence, s the court
gave this definition to the phrase "living separate and apart":
The discontinuance of sexual relations is not in itself
a living 'separate and apart' within the meaning of some
statutes, and a divorce will be denied where it appears
that during the period relied upon the parties had lived
in the same house. It has been said that what the law
makes a ground for divorce is the living separately and
apart of the husband and wife continuously for a certain
number of years. This separation implies something more
than a discontinuance of sexual relations. It implies the
living apart for such a period in such a manner that those
in the neighborhood may see that the husband and wife
are not living together.
The Court continues:
[O]ur statute contemplates a living separate and apart
from each other, the complete cessation of cohabitation
(the parties) must hold themselves out as separated to the
whole world. Separation should not depend on evidence
which must be sought for behind the dosed doors of the
marital domicile. 59
One case 60 took the opposite view in 1946 and granted a
divorce where wife and husband lived in the same house but
56 Rodgers v. Rodgers, 258 Ala. 471, 63 So.2d 807 (1953).
57 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945).
58 17 AM. JUR., Divorce and Separations § 185 (1957).
59 Supra note 57, at 491 (1945).
60 Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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in separate rooms on separate floors and did not eat together.
The Washington, D. C. court said that "The essential thing
is not separate roofs but separate lives." 61
That the separation must continue uninterrupted for three
years is self explanatory. If the marital relationship is resumed
at any time before the lapse of three years, it will stop the
running of the period. Depending upon the direction Vir-
ginia takes, other acts that might interrupt the three year
period are insanity, request to continue the marriage, or a
reconciliation. In North Carolina it was held6" that the fact
the husband was supporting his wife is not such an interruption
to preclude him from getting the divroce. If he failed to
support her he would not be able to get his divorce, for in
that state he must be free from fault. If he had failed to
provide support he would have been guilty of abandonment.
It should be noted that no other reason for the separation
need be given than that the parties wish to end the marriage.
In Thompson v. Thompson,63 a divorce was granted on grounds
of statutory separation and the parties separated for no other
reason than incompatibility and want of affection.
Conclusion
The new ground in Virginia is a liberal amendment to
its divorce laws, and it will be in the best public interest if the
amendment is liberally construed. The court should allow a
divorce where two persons are no longer "married" in the
full sense of the word. It would be better for the State, the
parties, and society if the courts do not try to force a shell of
a marriage upon two persons who no longer wish to be man
and wife.
61 Ibid.
62 Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 SE.2d 902 (1942).
03 53 Wis. 153, 10 N.W. 166 (1881).
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